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RACHEL GRIFFITH
PETER HOWITT
This paper investigates the relationship between product market competition
and innovation. We ﬁnd strong evidence of an inverted-U relationship using panel
data. We develop a model where competition discourages laggard ﬁrms from
innovating but encourages neck-and-neck ﬁrms to innovate. Together with the
effect of competition on the equilibrium industry structure, these generate an
inverted-U. Two additional predictions of the model—that the average technologi-
cal distance between leaders and followers increases with competition, and that
the inverted-U is steeper when industries are more neck-and-neck—are both
supported by the data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Economists have long been interested in the relationship
between competition and innovation, but economic theory seems
to be contradicted by the evidence. Theories of industrial organi-
zation typically predict that innovation should decline with com-
petition
1 while empirical work ﬁnds that it increases.
2 This paper
reexamines this relationship using panel data and ﬁnds clear
nonlinearities in the form of an inverted-U shape, illustrated by
Figure I, which plots patents against the Lerner index, with an
exponential quadratic overlay. The possibility of an inverted-U
relationship between competition and innovation was hinted at
by Scherer [1967], who showed a positive relationship between
* The authors would like to thank Daron Acemoglu, William Baumol, Timo-
thy Bresnahan, Jan Boone, Wendy Carlin, Paul David, Janice Eberly, Edward
Glaeser, Dennis Ranque, Mark Shankerman, Robert Solow, Manuel Trajtenberg,
Alwyn Young, John Van Reenen, two anonymous referees, and participants at
seminars including Canadian Institute of Advance Research, Harvard University,
and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Financial support for this project was
provided by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Centre for the
Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy at the Institute for Fiscal Studies, and
the ESRC/EPSRC Advanced Institute of Management (AIM) initiative. The data
were developed with funding from the Leverhulme Trust.
1. See our discussion in Section III below. However, the replacement effect in
Arrow [1962] and the efﬁciency effects in Gilbert and Newbury [1982] and Rein-
ganum [1983] go in the opposite direction.
2. See Geroski [1995], Nickell [1996], and Blundell, Grifﬁth, and Van Reenen
[1999].
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701patenting activity and ﬁrm size in the cross section, with a di-
minishing impact at larger sizes when allowing for nonlinearities.
To our knowledge, no existing model of product market competi-
tion and innovation predicts an inverted-U pattern.
An explanation for these results could be pieced together by
combining agency models
3 with Schumpeterian models; however,
this seems unsatisfactory. Instead, we develop an extension of
Aghion, Harris, and Vickers [1997]
4 that can ﬁt the entire curve.
In this model both current technological leaders and their follow-
ers in any industry can innovate, and innovations by leaders and
followers all occur step-by-step. Innovation incentives depend not
so much upon postinnovation rents, as in previous endogenous
growth models where all innovations are made by outsiders, but
upon the difference between postinnovation and preinnovation
rents of incumbent ﬁrms. In this case, more competition may
foster innovation and growth, because it may reduce a ﬁrm’s
preinnovation rents by more than it reduces its postinnovation
rents. In other words, competition may increase the incremental
proﬁts from innovating, and thereby encourage R&D investments
aimed at “escaping competition.” This should be particularly true
in sectors where incumbent ﬁrms are operating at similar tech-
nological levels; in these “neck-and-neck” sectors, preinnovation
rents should be especially reduced by product market competi-
tion. On the other hand, in sectors where innovations are made by
laggard ﬁrms with already low initial proﬁts, product market
competition will mainly affect postinnovation rents, and therefore
the Schumpeterian effect of competition should dominate.
The essence of the inverted-U relationship between competi-
tion and innovation is that the fraction of sectors with neck-and-
neck competitors is itself endogenous, and depends upon equilib-
rium innovation intensities in the different types of sectors. More
speciﬁcally, when competition is low, a larger equilibrium frac-
tion of sectors involve neck-and-neck competing incumbents, so
that overall the escape-competition effect is more likely to domi-
nate the Schumpeterian effect. On the other hand, when compe-
tition is high, the Schumpeterian effect is more likely to domi-
nate, because a larger fraction of sectors in equilibrium have
innovation being performed by laggard ﬁrms with low initial
proﬁts. The inverted-U shape is conﬁrmed by our U. K. panel
3. Hart [1983], Schmidt [1997], Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey [1999].
4. See also Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers [2001].
702 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSdata, and it is robust to a number of controls and experiments.
5
Our model provides additional testable predictions on the rela-
tionship between competition and the composition of industries,
and more speciﬁcally between competition and the average de-
gree of “neck-and-neckness” in the economy, which are also vin-
dicated by the data.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
displays the empirical evidence on the existence of an inverted-U
relationship between competition and innovation. Section III ar-
gues that existing models of competition and innovation cannot
account for the inverted-U pattern. We develop a theoretical
rationale for this relationship, derive some additional empirical
predictions, and validate them with data. Finally, Section IV
concludes.
II. THE IMPACT OF COMPETITION ON INNOVATION
The early empirical literature, inspired by Schumpeter
[1943], estimated linear cross-sectional relationships and typi-
cally found a negative relationship between competition and in-
novation, conﬁrming the theoretical prejudices of the era. Scherer
[1967] developed this research by allowing for additional nonlin-
earities, and in a cross-sectional analysis of Fortune 500 ﬁrms
discovered a signiﬁcant inverted-U shape, with higher competi-
tion initially increasing then decreasing the rate of innovation.
But research since then has returned to estimating linear speci-
ﬁcations; for example, Nickell [1996] and Blundell, Grifﬁth, and
Van Reenen [1999] both ﬁnd a positive linear effect of competition
on innovation. In this paper we allow for a nonmonotonic
relationship.
II.A. Measuring Innovation
There is a large literature on measuring innovation inten-
sity, with the most commonly used measures being R&D expen-
diture and patenting activity. We use the average number of
5. To deal with the possible endogeneity of competition, we use U. K. data and
exploit the major policy reforms undertaken over the 1970s and 1980s, which
dramatically changed the nature and extent of competition across industries and
over time. The radical policies of the Thatcher administration, the introduction of
the European Single Market Program (SMP), and the reforms imposed by the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission together provide a number of policy changes
that vary across time and industries and allow us to identify the causal impact of
competition on innovation.
703 COMPETITION AND INNOVATIONpatents taken out by ﬁrms in an industry, and to reﬂect the
heterogeneous value of patents, we weight each patent by the
number of times it has been cited by another patent. These data
are generated by matching the NBER patents database
6 to ac-
counting data on ﬁrms listed on the London Stock Exchange
(from Datastream). Our sample includes all ﬁrms with names
beginning “A” to “L” plus all large R&D ﬁrms. After removing
ﬁrms involved in large mergers or acquisitions and those with
missing data, we have an unbalanced panel of 311 ﬁrms spanning
seventeen two-digit SIC codes over the period 1973–1994. We also
have information on citations to and from each patent, which
enables us to construct a count of citation-weighted patents. We
take the average value of citation-weighted patents of ﬁrms
within each industry (SIC code) in each year. We do not observe
a sufﬁcient number of ﬁrms in all industries in all years, so our
resulting industry level panel is also unbalanced with 354
industry-year observations. Some descriptive statistics are pro-
vided in Appendix 2.
II.B. Measuring Competition
Our main indicator of product market competition is the
Lerner Index, or price cost margin, following Nickell [1996]. This
measure has several advantages over indicators such as market
share or the Herﬁndahl concentration index. These other mea-
sures rely more directly on precise deﬁnitions of geographic and
product markets, which is particularly difﬁcult in our application,
as many U. K. ﬁrms operate in international markets, so that
market concentration measures based only on U. K. data may be
extremely misleading.
The price cost margin we use is measured by operating prof-
its net of depreciation, provisions and an estimated ﬁnancial cost
of capital
7 divided by sales,
liit 
operating profit  financial cost
sales .
6. See Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg [2000]. The NBER database contains the
patents taken out in the U. S. patent ofﬁce, which is where innovations are
effectively patented internationally, dated by the time of application.
7. The cost of capital is assumed to be 0.085 for all ﬁrms and time periods and
the capital stock is measured using the perpetual inventory method. The invert-
ed-U shape is robust to excluding this ﬁnancial cost from the Lerner measure,
principally because it is relatively small and constant over time.
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within the industry,
(1) cjt  1 
1
Njt
ij
liit,
where i indexes ﬁrms, j indexes industry, t indexes time, and Njt
is the number of ﬁrms in industry j in year t. A value of 1
indicates perfect competition (price equals marginal cost) while
values below 1 indicate some degree of market power. In comput-
ing this index, we use the entire sample of Stock Market Listed
ﬁrms in each industry, not only those in the patenting subsample.
II.C. A Nonlinear Relationship
We use ﬂexible nonlinear estimators to investigate the basic
shape of the relationship between competition and innovation.
Denoting n as the hazard rate and c as the measure of competi-
tion, we start by deﬁning the competition innovation relationship
as
(2) n  e
gc, where g() is some unknown function.
Suppose that the patent process has a Poisson distribution with
hazard rate (2), then the expected number of patents satisﬁes
(3) Epc  e
gc.
Parametric models that study count data processes typically
base their speciﬁcation on the Poisson model with a parametric
(linear) form for g(c), but they relax the strong assumptions on
higher moments.
8 We follow this approach in our empirical analy-
sis, basing our estimator on the ﬁrst moment (3). We adopt a
ﬂexible speciﬁcation for g(c), because we are particularly inter-
ested in allowing the data to determine the shape of the relation-
ship between innovation and product market competition.
It is very likely that different industries will have observed
levels of patenting activity that have no direct causal relationship
with product market competition, but reﬂect other institutional
features of the industry. Consequently, industry ﬁxed effects are
essential to remove any spurious correlation or “endogeneity” of
this type. Time effects are also included to remove common mac-
roeconomic shocks. Conditional on industry and time effects, in-
8. See Hausman, Hall, and Griliches [1984], for example.
705 COMPETITION AND INNOVATIONdustry patent behavior is related to industry competition accord-
ing to
(4) Epjtcjt,xjt  e
gcjtx jt	,
where xjt represents a complete set of time and industry dummy
variables. We use moment condition (4) to deﬁne a semiparamet-
ric moment estimator and approximate g(c) with a spline, follow-
ing Ai and Chen [2003].
In Figure I we show the scatter of data points in between the
tenth and ninetieth deciles of the citation-weighted patent distri-
bution, and overlay a ﬁtted exponential quadratic curve. The
same exponential quadratic curve is plotted together with a
spline approximation in Figure II. It can be seen that the expo-
nentialquadraticspeciﬁcationprovidesaveryreasonableapproxi-
mation to the nonparametric spline, and that they both show a
clear inverted-U shape. The estimated coefﬁcients for the expo-
nential quadratic model are presented in Table I. The ﬁrst col-
umn shows that both the linear and quadratic terms are individ-
ually and jointly signiﬁcant. In the second column we reestimate
including industry effects, which is our preferred speciﬁcation,
FIGURE I
Scatter Plot of Innovation on Competition
The ﬁgure plots a measure of competition on the x-axis against citation-
weighted patents on the y-axis. Each point represents an industry-year. The
scatter shows all data points that lie in between the tenth and ninetieth deciles in
the citation-weighted patents distribution. The exponential quadratic curve that
is overlaid is reported in column (2) of Table I.
706 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSand which removes the bias that results from correlation between
permanent levels of innovative activity and product market com-
petition, and again ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inverted-U shape.
The underlying distribution of the data is shown by the
intensity of the points on the estimated curves. These indicate
that the peak of the inverted U lies near the median of the
distribution (the median is 0.95) so that industries are well
spread across the U-shape. We can also see that a linear relation-
ship would yield a positive slope, conﬁrming the results presented
in Nickell [1996]. Before moving to the results using the policy
instruments, we consider three robustness checks. The ﬁrst uses
ﬁve-year averages to estimate this relationship in view of the
potential lags in the relationship between competition and inno-
vation. As shown in the third column of Table I, this also displays
a clear inverted-U shape.
9 The second robustness check, not
shown, uses R&D expenditure as an alternative innovation mea-
sure. Again, we ﬁnd an inverted-U shape, although due to a
9. The data span a 22-year period (1973 to 1994). Therefore, the ﬁrst period
was set at seven years with the remainder at ﬁve years each.
FIGURE II
Innovation and Competition: Exponential Quadratic and the Semiparametric
Speciﬁcations with Year and Industry Effects
The ﬁgure plots a measure of competition on the x-axis against citation-
weighted patents on the y-axis. Each point represents an industry-year. The
circles show the exponential quadratic curve that is reported in column (2) of
Table I. The triangles show a nonparametric spline.
707 COMPETITION AND INNOVATIONsubstantially smaller sample,
10 the coefﬁcients are not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. Finally, we ﬁt the relationship for each of the top
four innovating industries in our sample, and in each case there
is part or all of an inverted-U shape (see the earlier working
paper version of this paper [Aghion et al. 2004]).
II.D. Using Policy Instruments
The major obstacle to empirical research in this area is that
competition and innovation are mutually endogenous. Without
addressing this, any results we ﬁnd are likely to be biased toward
10. In the United Kingdom R&D was not a mandatory reporting item prior to
1990, so it is not available for the majority of ﬁrms prior to this date. This is one
of the reasons we use citation-weighted patents as our main innovation indicator.
TABLE I
EXPONENTIAL QUADRATIC:B ASIC SPECIFICATION
Dependent variable: citation-
weighted patents (1) (2) (3) (4)
Data frequency Annual Annual
5-year
averages Annual
Competitionjt 152.80 387.46 819.44 385.13
(55.74) (67.74) (265.63) (67.56)
Competition squaredjt 
80.99 
204.55 
434.43 
204.83
(29.61) (36.17) (141.43) (36.06)
Signiﬁcance of: Competitionjt,
Competition squaredjt
7.60 38.34 9.97 32.59
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Signiﬁcance of policy instruments
in reduced form
10.11
(0.002)
Signiﬁcance of other instruments
in reduced form
5.00
(0.000)
Control functions in regression 4.38
(4.04)
R
2 of reduced form 0.801
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 354 354 67 354
Competitionjt is measured by (1-Lerner index) in the industry-year. All columns are estimated using an
unbalanced panel of seventeen industries over the period 1973 to 1994. Estimates are from a Poisson
regression. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. The standard errors in column (4) have not been
corrected for the inclusion of the control function. Signiﬁcance tests show likelihood ratio test-statistics and
P-value from the F-test of joint signiﬁcance. The fourth column includes a control function. The excluded
variables are policy instruments speciﬁed in Table II, imports over value-added in the same industry-year,
TFP in the same industry-year, output minus variable costs over output in the same industry-year and
estimates of markups from industry-country regression [Martins et al. 1996] interacted with time trend, all
for the United States and France.
708 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSﬁnding a more negative relationship between competition and
innovation if higher levels of innovation act, for example, to
reduce competition.
11 We address this problem by using a set of
policy instruments that provide exogenous variation in the degree
of industrywide competition. Since we are including industry and
time effects, this approach identiﬁes the competition effect
through the differential timing of the introduction of policy
changes across industries. The three sets of policy instrument
used are the Thatcher era privatizations, the EU Single Market
Programme,
12 and the Monopoly and Merger Commission inves-
tigations that resulted in structural or behavioral remedies being
imposed on the industry. Table II lists the policy instruments
that are used, the industries that are affected, and the year(s) in
which the policy changes occurred.
We use these policy variables to instrument the changes in
competition. These policy changes were driven by a combination
of political orthodoxy, desires for European integration, and regu-
latory responses to anticompetitive behavior, with little obvious
link to industry-level innovation performance. We specify a re-
duced-form model for the competition measure:
11. See, for example, the endogenous barrier to entry story in Sutton [1998].
12. See the earlier working paper version for full details of all the policy
instruments [Aghion et al. 2004]. The Single Market Program differentially in-
creased trade liberalization across U. K. industries in 1988. All tariff and nontariff
barriers were phased out, with the increase in competition depending on the
extent of pre-SMP tariff and nontariff barriers. The European Commission’s
Cechinni report ranked all three-digit SIC industries into low, medium, and high
impact, and we use this ranking for our policy instrument identiﬁcation.
TABLE II
POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Industry Year(s) Policy
All, but differential impacts 1988 Single Market Program
Brewing 1986 MMC action
Cars 1984, 1987, 1988 MMC action, Privatization
Car parts 1982, 1987 MMC action, Privatization
Periodicals 1987 MMC action
Razors and blades 1990 MMC action
Ordnance 1987 Privatization
Steel 1987 Privatization
Telecoms 1981, 1984, 1989 MMC action, Privatization
Textiles 1989 MMC action
709 COMPETITION AND INNOVATION(5) cjt  zjt  x jt  vjt,
which assumes that E[vjtzjt,xjt]  0, where zjt denote the policy
instruments. The idea is then to use functions of the vjt as
controls in an extended version of the moment condition to strip
out any element of cjt which is endogenous with the error term.
The control function assumption can be expressed as
(6) Ee
ujtcjt,xjt,vjt  1,
so that controlling for vjt in the conditional moment condition is
sufﬁcient to retrieve the conditional moment assumption.
13
The fourth column in Table I shows the estimates for our
exponential quadratic speciﬁcation that control for endogeneity
using our set of instruments. The coefﬁcient estimates are similar
to the second column. In the bottom part of the table, we present
some diagnostic statistics. They show that the instruments are
signiﬁcant in the reduced form, that the policy instruments in
particular are signiﬁcant, and that they have explanatory power.
The relationship between innovation and product market compe-
tition for the standard quadratic and also for the instrumented
quadratic display a similar inverted-U relationship.
III. EXPLAINING THE INVERTED U
III.A. Main Existing Theories of Competition and Innovation
In this subsection we brieﬂy summarize what existing theo-
ries have to say about the relationship between competition and
innovation or competition and productivity growth. As it turns
out, none of them can account for the inverted-U pattern de-
scribed in the previous section.
The leading IO models of product differentiation and monopo-
listic competition, namely Salop [1977]) and Dixit and Stiglitz
[1977], deliver the prediction that more intense product market
competition
14 reduces postentry rents, and therefore reduces the
equilibrium number of entrants. Thus, these models can only
account for the decreasing part of the inverted-U curve: increased
13. To recover the parameters of interest, we integrate over the empirical
distribution of v and recover the “average structural function” (see Blundell and
Powell [2003]).
14. Increased product market competition is modeled as a reduction in unit
transport cost in Salop [1977] or as an increase in the substitutability between
differentiated products in Dixit and Stiglitz [1977].
710 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSproduct market competition discourages innovation by reducing
postentry rents. This prediction is shared by most existing models
of endogenous growth (e.g., Romer [1990], Aghion and Howitt
[1992], and Grossman and Helpman [1991]), where an increase in
product market competition, or in the rate of imitation, has a
negative effect on productivity growth by reducing the monopoly
rents that reward new innovation.
15
In all the above-mentioned papers, ﬁrms are simply proﬁt-
maximizing individuals. Instead, Hart [1983] considers the case
of ﬁrms run by so-called “satisﬁcing” managers who do not value
proﬁts per se, but yet draw private beneﬁts from maintaining the
ﬁrm aﬂoat and thereby keeping their job. Then, increased com-
petition may induce otherwise reluctant managers to put more
effort into reducing costs in order to avoid bankruptcy.
16 How-
ever, this does not generate an inverted-U relationship between
competition and managerial incentives: either most ﬁrms have
managers who are a sufﬁciently residual claimant over the ﬁrm’s
monetary revenue, in which case we again obtain a negative
correlation between competition and innovation, or they are run
by satisﬁcing managers, in which case competition is unambigu-
ously good for innovation.
III.B. A Theoretical Framework
There is a unit mass of identical consumers, each supplying
a unit of labor inelastically, with a constant rate of intertemporal
discount r and a logarithmic instantaneous utility function
u(yt)  ln yt. The consumption good y is produced at each date t
using input services from a continuum of intermediate sectors,
according to the production function,
(7) ln yt 
0
1
ln xjtdj,
in which each xj is an aggregate of two intermediate goods pro-
duced by duopolists in sector j, deﬁned by the subutility function,
15. In these models the reason why competition policy is unambiguously
detrimental to growth is the same as the reason why patent protection is unam-
biguously good for growth: patent protection raises monopoly rents from innova-
tion whereas increased product market competition destroys these rents.
16. This positive effect of competition disappears if managers value monetary
payoffs sufﬁciently, as shown by Scharfstein [1988] and more recently by Schmidt
[1997].
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The logarithmic structure of (7) implies that in equilibrium
individuals spend the same amount on each basket xj. We nor-
malize this common amount to unity by using current expendi-
ture as the numeraire for the prices pAj and pBj at each date.
Thus, the representative household chooses each xAj and xBj to
maximize xAj  xBj subject to the budget constraint: pAjxAj 
pBjxBj  1.
Each ﬁrm produces using labor as the only input, according
to a constant-returns production function, and takes the wage
rate as given. Thus, the unit costs of production cA and cB of the
two ﬁrms in an industry are independent of the quantities pro-
duced. Now, let k denote the technology level of duopoly ﬁrm i in
some industry j; that is, one unit of labor currently employed by
ﬁrm i generates an output ﬂow equal to
(8) Ai  
ki, i  A,B,
where 1 is a parameter that measures the size of a leading-
edge innovation. Equivalently, it takes 

ki units of labor for ﬁrm
i to produce one unit of output. The state of an industry is then
fully characterized by a pair of integers (l,m), where l is the
leader’s technology and m is the technology gap of the leader over
the follower. We deﬁne m (respectively, 
m) to be the equilib-
rium proﬁt ﬂow of a ﬁrm m steps ahead of (respectively, behind)
its rival.
17
For expositional simplicity, we assume that knowledge spill-
overs between leader and follower in any intermediate industry
are such that the maximum sustainable gap is m  1. That is, if
a ﬁrm already one step ahead innovates, the lagging ﬁrm will
automatically learn to copy the leader’s previous technology and
thereby remain only one step behind. Thus, at any point in time,
there will be two kinds of intermediate sectors in the economy: (i)
leveled or neck-and-neck sectors where both ﬁrms are at techno-
logical par with one another, so that m  0; (ii) unleveled sectors,
where one ﬁrm (the leader) lies one step ahead of its competitor
(the laggard or follower) in the same industry, so that m  1.
18
17. The above logarithmic technology along with the cost structure c(x)  x 


k implies that the proﬁt in the industry depends only on the gap m between the
two ﬁrms, and not on absolute levels of technology.
18. Aghion et al. [2001] analyze the more general case where m is un-
bounded. However, unlike in this section, that paper provides no closed-form
solution for the equilibrium R&D levels and the steady-state industry structure,
712 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSBy spending the R&D cost (n)  n
2/2 in units of labor, a
leader (or frontier) ﬁrm moves one technological step ahead, with
a Poisson hazard rate of n. We call n the “innovation rate” or
“R&D intensity” of the ﬁrm. We assume that a follower ﬁrm can
move one step ahead with hazard rate h, even if it spends nothing
on R&D, by copying the leader’s technology. Thus n
2/2 is the
R&D cost of a follower ﬁrm moving ahead with a hazard rate n 
h. Let n0 denote the R&D intensity of each ﬁrm in a neck-and-
neck industry; and let n
1 denote the R&D intensity of a follower
ﬁrm in an unleveled industry; if n1 denotes the R&D intensity of
the leader in an unleveled industry, note that n1  0, since our
assumption of automatic catch-up means that a leader cannot
gain any further advantage by innovating.
We model the degree of product market competition inversely
by the degree to which the two ﬁrms in a neck-and-neck industry
are able to collude. They do not collude when the industry is
unlevel. Thus, the laggard in an unlevel industry makes zero
proﬁt, while the leader makes a proﬁt equal to the difference
between its revenue, which we have normalized to unity, and its
cost, which is 

1 times its revenue, given that its price is  times
its unit cost:

1  0 and 1  1  

1.
Each ﬁrm in a level industry earns a proﬁt of 0 if the ﬁrms are
unable to collude, since they are in Bertrand competition with
identical products and identical unit costs, and 1/2 if there is
maximum collusion. More generally, we assume that
0  ε1,0  ε  1/2,
and we parameterize product market competition by 1 
 ε,
that is, one minus the fraction of a leader’s proﬁts that the level
ﬁrm can attain through collusion. Note that  is also the incre-
mental proﬁt of an innovator in a neck-and-neck industry, nor-
malized by the leader’s proﬁt.
We next analyze how the equilibrium research intensities n0
and n
1, and consequently the aggregate innovation rate, vary
with our measure of competition.
and therefore cannot formally establish qualitative results such as the existence
of an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation or characterize
the relationship between competition and the distribution of technological gaps.
713 COMPETITION AND INNOVATIONIII.C. The Schumpeterian and “Escape-Competition” Effects
We assume that the equilibrium innovation rates n0 and n
1
are determined by the necessary conditions for a symmetric
Markov-stationary equilibrium in which each ﬁrm seeks to maxi-
mize expected discounted proﬁts, with a discount rate r  0.
19 In
Appendix 1 we establish
PROPOSITION 1. The equilibrium research intensity by each neck-
and-neck ﬁrm is
n0  h
2  21  h,
which increases with higher product market competition ,
whereas the equilibrium research intensity of a laggard ﬁrm
is
n
1  h
2  n0
2  21  h  n0,
which decreases with higher product market competition .
The latter effect (on n
1) is the basic Schumpeterian effect
that results from reducing the rents that can be captured by a
follower who succeeds in catching up with its rival by innovating.
The former effect (on n0) we refer to as an “escape-competition
effect,” namely that more competition induces neck-and-neck
ﬁrms to innovate in order to escape competition, since the incre-
mental value of getting ahead is increased with higher PMC. On
average, an increase in product market competition will thus
have an ambiguous effect on growth. It induces faster productiv-
ity growth in currently neck-and-neck sectors and slower growth
in currently unleveled sectors. The overall effect on growth will
thus depend on the (steady-state) fraction of leveled versus un-
leveled sectors. But this steady-state fraction is itself endogenous,
since it depends upon equilibrium R&D intensities in both types
of sectors. We proceed to show under which condition this overall
effect is an inverted U, and at the same time derive additional
predictions for further empirical testing.
Let 1 (respectively, 0) denote the steady-state probability
of being an unleveled (respectively, neck-and-neck) industry.
During any unit time interval, the steady-state probability that a
sector moves from being unleveled to leveled is 1(n
1  h), and
19. We have established by numerical simulation that all of our results hold
with r  0.
714 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSthe probability that it moves in the opposite direction is 20n0.I n
steady state, these two probabilities must be equal
(9) 1n
1  h  20n0.
This, together with the fact that 1  0  1, implies that the
aggregate ﬂow of innovations is
(10) I  20n0  1n
1  h  21n
1  h 
4n0n
1  h
2n0  n
1  h.
We now analyze how this ﬂow varies with product market
competition and establish the possibility of an inverted-U pat-
tern. Since by Proposition 1, n0 is an increasing function of ,w e
can use n0 as our proximate measure of product market compe-
tition, which in turn will prove convenient when deriving our
main predictions below. Note that n0 takes values on the interval
[x   h2  1 
 h, x   h2  21 
 h], with x  x 
corresponding to maximum collusion (0  1/2) and x  x 
corresponding to maximum competition (0  0). We have
PROPOSITION 2. Whenever the value x ˜  [h2  21]/3 is inte-
rior to the interval [x ,x ], the aggregate innovation rate (n0)
follows an inverted-U pattern: it increases with competition
n0 for all n0  [x ,x ˜) and decreases for all n0  (x ˜,x ]. If x ˜ 
x , then the aggregate innovation rate increases with n0 for
all n0  [x ,x ] so that the escape-competition effect always
dominates. If x ˜  x , then it decreases with n0 for all n0 
[x ,x ] so that the Schumpeterian effect always dominates.
Moreover, each of these cases arises for a nonempty subset of
parameter values.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
The inverted-U shape can be explained as follows. When
there is not much product market competition, there is hardly
any incentive for neck-and-neck ﬁrms to innovate, and therefore
the overall innovation rate will be highest when the sector is
unleveled. Thus, the industry will be quick to leave the unleveled
state (which it does as soon as the laggard innovates) and slow to
leave the leveled state (which will not happen until one of the
neck-and-neck ﬁrms innovates). As a result, the industry will
spend most of the time in the leveled state, where the escape-
competition effect dominates (n0 is decreasing in 0). In other
words, if the degree of competition is very low to begin with, an
715 COMPETITION AND INNOVATIONincrease in competition should result in a faster average innova-
tion rate.
On the other hand, when competition is initially very high,
there is relatively little incentive for the laggard in an unleveled
state to innovate. Thus, the industry will be relatively slow to
leave the unleveled state. Meanwhile, the large incremental
proﬁt 1 
 0 gives ﬁrms in the leveled state a relatively large
incentive to innovate, so that the industry will be relatively quick
to leave the leveled state. As a result, the industry will spend
most of the time in the unleveled state where the Schumpeterian
effect is at work on the laggard, while the leader never innovates.
In other words, if the degree of competition is very high to begin
with, an increase in competition should result in a slower average
innovation rate.
20
Note that, according to this model, the empirical measure c of
competition, that we used in the previous section, has an expected
value of
(11) c  1  1
1
2  21  11  1.
That is, in accordance with equation (1) above, the industry
average Lerner index in an uneven industry is 1/2, since the
laggard has a Lerner of zero, whereas the industry average Ler-
ner index in a leveled industry is the Lerner index of each ﬁrm,
equal to its proﬁts divided by its revenue: 0/(1/2)  2(1 
 )1.
We show in Appendix 1 that in our model
PROPOSITION 3. The empirical measure c deﬁned by (11) is a mono-
tonically increasing function of the theoretical measure 
used in the other propositions.
III.D. Additional Predictions on Technological Spread
and Competition
In addition to providing a rationale for the inverted-U pat-
tern uncovered in the previous section, the model delivers two
additional predictions, which are summarized in the following
two propositions and which we prove in Appendix 1.
20. Thus, the reason why the escape-competition effect dominates when
competition is low, whereas the Schumpeterian effect on laggards dominates
when competition is intense is the “composition effect” of competition on the
steady-state distribution of technology gaps across sectors.
716 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSPROPOSITION 4. The expected technological gap in an industry
increases with product market competition.
The intuition is simple: we know that the higher the degree
of product market competition, the higher the research inten-
sity in neck-and-neck sectors, and the lower the research in-
tensity in unleveled sectors. This, in turn, implies that any
sector will spend a higher fraction of its time being unleveled,
so that on average over time the technological gap between
ﬁrms in that sector will be higher. By the law of large numbers
the same will be true for the economy as a whole at any point
in time.
The next proposition is equally intuitive: it states the exis-
tence of a positive interaction between the escape-competition
effect and the average distance of the industry to its frontier, in
the sense that in industries where ﬁrms are closer to their tech-
nological frontier over time, the escape-competition effect tends to
be stronger (that is, the increasing part of the inverted U tends to
be steeper). More precisely, suppose that there are industries
with large spillover parameter h and industries with small h.
Those with large h will tend to be more neck-and-neck on average
over time.
21 Now, we can compare the magnitude of the escape-
competition effect across industries with different values of h and
establish that
PROPOSITION 5. The peak of the inverted U is larger, and occurs at
a higher degree of competition, in more neck-and-neck indus-
tries. More formally, let  ˜ be the incremental proﬁt at which
x  x ˜  [h2  21]/3; then both  ˜ and (x ˜) are increasing
in h.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
III.E. Testing the Technological Spread Predictions
To empirically assess the predictions on the technological
spread and competition relationship, we ﬁrst need a measure of
the size of the technology gap between ﬁrms within an industry.
We capture this by the proportional distance a ﬁrm is from the
technological frontier, as measured by total factor productivity.
More formally, we let
21. This is formally established in Appendix 1, in the remark following the
proof of Proposition 4.
717 COMPETITION AND INNOVATION(12) mit  TFPFt  TFPit/TFPFt,
where F denotes the frontier ﬁrm (with the highest TFP) and i
denotes nonfrontier ﬁrms. So, at the ﬁrm level, mit  0, and
mFt  0. We use an industry level measure mjt that is the
average across ﬁrms in the industry. A lower value of mjt
indicates that ﬁrms in industry j are technologically closer to
the frontier (and therefore more like the neck-and-neck ﬁrms
in our theoretical section), while a high value of mjt indicates a
large technological gap with the frontier (so that ﬁrms in those
industries are more like laggard ﬁrms in an unleveled
industry).
The ﬁrst key prediction on the technological spread is that, in
equilibrium, the average technology gap between leaders and
followers should be an increasing function of the overall level of
industrywide competition (so that average neck-and-neckness
should be a decreasing function of competition). This is tested and
conﬁrmed in Table III, which reports the results from regressing
the industry average technology gap on the Lerner index with a
full set of year dummies (ﬁrst column) and a full set of year and
industry dummies (second column). In both cases there is a sig-
niﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient, suggesting that industries with
greater levels of competition have a higher average spread in
technology within the industry and a lower degree of technology
neck-and-neckness.
This result is perhaps surprising because the static intui-
tion is that higher competition should reduce the spread of TFP
by increasing the exit rate of low TFP ﬁrms, truncating the
lower tail of the distribution. But empirically we ﬁnd this static
effect of competition appears to be dominated by a more pow-
erful dynamic effect to increase the rate of innovation. As ﬁrms
innovate to try to escape competition, they increase the spread
of TFP within the industry, dominating any potential selective
exit effect.
The second theoretical prediction is that the inverted-U-
shaped relationship between competition and growth should be
steeper in more neck-and-neck industries. To assess this pre-
diction, we consider a subsample of our data—industries with
below median technological gap—which are the more neck-
and-neck industries. Figure III shows our baseline ﬁtted expo-
nential quadratic curve, as well as an exponential quadratic
curve ﬁtted to the subsample of high neck-and-neck industries.
718 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSTwo features stand out clearly. First, more neck-and-neck in-
dustries show a higher level of innovation activity for any level
of product market competition. Second, the inverted-U curve is
steeper for the more neck-and-neck industries, which accords
well with our theoretical predictions. These differences are
statistically signiﬁcant, as shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table
II, which reports the quadratic coefﬁcients for the whole sam-
ple and the high neck-and-neck industry subsample including
a full set of year dummies (third column) and a full set of year
and industry dummies (fourth column). The interaction terms
are jointly signiﬁcant in both cases.
TABLE III
TECHNOLOGY GAP AND EXPONENTIAL QUADRATIC WITH NECK-AND-NECK SPLIT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Technology
gap
Technology
gap
Citation-
weighted
patents
Citation-
weighted
patents
Estimation procedure
Linear
regression
Linear
regression Poisson Poisson
Competitionjt 2.858 0.942 183.81 424.46
(0.400) (0.419) (58.99) (69.5)
Competition squaredjt 
96.35 
222.9
(31.01) (36.9)
Competitionjt  Technology 1.43 3.82
gapjt (2.48) (2.66)
Competition squaredjt  
1.30 
3.84
Technology gapjt (2.59) (2.78)
Signiﬁcance of:
Competitionjt, 16.59 39.21
Competition squaredjt (0.00) (0.00)
Signiﬁcance of:
Competitionjt  Technology
gapjt,
9.74 7.93
Competition squaredjt 
Technology gapjt
(0.01) (0.02)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes
Competitionjt is measured by (1-Lerner index) in the industry-year. Technology gapjt is measured by the
average distance to the TFP frontier ﬁrm across all ﬁrms in the industry-year, so it is an inverse measure of
neck-and-neckness. All columns estimated using an unbalanced panel of 354 yearly observations on seven-
teen industries over the period 1973 to 1994. Signiﬁcance tests show likelihood ratio test-statistics and
P-value from the F-test of joint signiﬁcance. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. The standard errors
in columns 3 and 4 have not been corrected for the inclusion of the control function.
719 COMPETITION AND INNOVATIONIV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the relationship between product
market competition (PMC) and innovation using a ﬂexible
nonlinear estimator. We ﬁnd evidence that the competition-
innovation relationship takes the form of an inverted-U shape,
with industries distributed across both the increasing and de-
creasing sections of the U-shape. This inverted-U is robust to a
number of alternative speciﬁcations, including identifying the
causal impact of competition by exploiting a series of major policy
reforms in the United Kingdom.
To understand what is driving this inverted-U shape, we
extend the current theoretical literature on step-by-step innova-
tion to produce a model that delivers an inverted-U prediction. In
this model competition may increase the incremental proﬁt from
innovating, labeled the “escape-competition effect,” but competi-
tion may also reduce innovation incentives for laggards, labeled
the “Schumpeterian effect.” The balance between these two ef-
FIGURE III
Innovation and Competition: The Neck-and-Neck Split
The ﬁgure plots a measure of competition on the x-axis against citation-
weighted patents on the y-axis. Each point represents an industry-year. The
circles show the exponential quadratic curve that is reported in column (2) of
Table I. The triangles show the exponential quadratic curve estimated only on
neck-and-neck industries that is reported in column (4) of Table III.
720 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSfects changes between low and high levels of competition, gener-
ating an inverted-U relationship. In addition, this extension of
the theory provides two new predictions. First, the equilibrium
degree of technological neck-and-neckness among ﬁrms should
decrease with PMC, and second, the higher the average degree of
neck-and-neckness in an industry, the steeper the inverted-U
relationship between PMC and innovation. We take these two
additional predictions to the data and ﬁnd them to be consistent
with the data. This dual empirical and theoretical approach pro-
vides useful results on the impact of competition and closeness in
technology space on innovation, and also a model to understand
this and experiment with potential policy reforms.
APPENDIX 1: PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1
To solve for the equilibrium research intensities n0 and n
1
of neck-and-neck and laggard ﬁrms, we use Bellman equations.
More precisely, let Vm (respectively, V
m) denote the steady state
value of being currently a leader (respectively, a follower) in an
industry with technology gap m, and let r denote the rate of time
discount. We have the following Bellman equations:
(13) rV1  1  n
1  hV0  V1;
(14) rV
1  
1  n
1  hV0  V
1  n
1
2/2;
(15) rV0  0  n0 V1  V0  n0V
1  V0  n0
2/2.
In words, the annuity value rV1 of currently being a techno-
logical leader in an industry with gap m  1 at date t equals the
current proﬁt ﬂow 1, minus the expected capital loss (n
1 
h)(V0 
 V1) from having the follower catch up by one step with
the leader. The annuity value rV
1 of currently being a laggard,
is equal to the current proﬁt ﬂow 
1 plus the expected capital
gain (n
1  h)(V0 
 V
1) from catching up with the leader
minus the R&D cost
22 (n
1)
2/2. Finally, in the Bellman equation
for a neck-and-neck ﬁrm, there is no help factor h because there
is no leader, and n0  denotes the R&D intensity by the other ﬁrm
22. It follows by the same argument as used in Aghion et al. [2001] that the
equilibrium real wage rate will equal unity given our choice to normalize expen-
ditures equal to unity.
721 COMPETITION AND INNOVATIONin the same sector; in a symmetric Nash equilibrium both ﬁrms’
R&D intensities are equal; that is,
n0   n0.
Now, using the fact that each ﬁrm chooses its own R&D
intensity to maximize its current value, that is, to maximize the
right-hand side of the corresponding Bellman equation, we obtain
the ﬁrst-order conditions:
(16) n
1  V0  V
1;
(17) n0  V1  V0.
Eliminating the V’s between the Bellman equations and
ﬁrst-order conditions (13) to (17), yield the reduced form R&D
equations:
(18)
n0
2
2  r  hn0  1  0  0
(19)
n
1
2
2  r  h  n0n
1  0 
n0
2
2  0.
This system is recursive, as the ﬁrst equation solves for n0, and
then given n0 the second equation solves for n
1. For the special
case where r  0, we use the relationship 0  (1 
 )1 to obtain
(20) n0  
h  h
2  21
(21) n
1  
h  n0  h
2  n0
2  21.
We immediately see that n0 increases, whereas n
1 de-
creases with higher product market competition.
23 This estab-
lishes Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let
x  n0.
23. From equation (20),
n0


1
n0  h
 0.
From this and equation (21),
n
1


n0

1 
n0
n
1  h  n0  0.
722 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSAccording to equation (21) above,
n
1  x
2  B  x  h,
where
B  h
2  21.
Thus, we can reexpress the aggregate innovation rate (10) as
x  4x x
2  B  x
x
2  B  x
,
with
x  4B
1
x
2  B  x
21 
2x
x
2  B.
The expression
fx  1 
2x
x
2  B
is decreasing in x, with a unique value:
x ˜  B/3,
at which f(x)  0. Therefore, (x) is quasi-concave, with (x) 
0a sx  x ˜. Therefore, the inverted-U pattern will obtain when-
ever x ˜  (x ,x ), the escape-competition effect will dominate if x  
x ˜ and the Schumpeterian effect will always dominate if x   x ˜.
Now let h/1. One can easily establish that
x 
x ˜  
2  2  

2  2/3
and
x 
x ˜  
2  1  

2  2/3
.
Thus, the inverted-U pattern will obtain whenever

2  1  
2  2/3    
2  2;
the escape-competition effect will strictly dominate over the
whole interval [x ,x ] whenever

2  2/3    
2  2;
ﬁnally, the Schumpeterian effect will dominate over the whole
interval [x ,x ] whenever
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2  2/3    
2  1.
Each of the corresponding three regions is nonempty, which es-
tablishes Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
From equations (9) and (21) we have
1 
2n0
n0
2  B  n0
,
where B is deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 2 above. From this
and (11):
c
  211  1 
1
4  ε
1

 21
n0
2  B  n0
n0
2  B  n0

1
4  ε
1

 21
n0
2  B  n0
n0
2  B  n01 
1
4  ε
2
n0
2  B
n0
,
where ε  1 
 . From this and Proposition 1,
c
  21
n0
2  B  n0
n0
2  B  n01 
1
4  ε
21
n0
2  B
1
n0  h,
so we need only show that
n0
2  Bn0  h  2
1
4  ε1.
This clearly holds when ε  1/4. So suppose that ε  1/4. Then we
need only show that
(22) n0
2  Bn0  h
2  4
1
4  ε
2
1
2.
It follows from equations (20) and (21) that
n0
2  B  n
1  n0  h  n0  h
so
n0
2  B  n0  h
2  h
2  21  ε1  21  ε1.
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n0
2  Bn0  h
2  41  ε
21
2,
which implies condition (22).
Proof of Proposition 4
Note that the expected technological gap is given by
G  0  0  1  1  1 
2n0
2n0  n
1  h ,
which can be reexpressed as
G 1  n0
2  B  n0
2n0 

1
.
This latter expression is clearly increasing in n0 and therefore
with product market competition. This establishes Proposition 4.
Remark. The expected technological gap
G 1 
n
1  h
2n0 

1
is decreasing in h. This stems from the fact that n0 is decreasing
in h whereas n
1  h is increasing in h. To see the former, note
that, from equation (20),
n0
h  

n0
n0  h  
1,0,
whereas the latter follows from this and equation (21):
n
1
h 
h
h
2  n0
2  21
 1 
n0
h
2  n0
2  21
 1
n0
h  
1,
since
n0  h
2  n0
2  21
and
n0
h  0.
725 COMPETITION AND INNOVATIONProof of Proposition 5
Since
B  h
2  21,
therefore, h will affect x ˜  B/3 and (x ˜) via its positive effect
on B. Assume that x ˜ is interior to the interval (x ,x ). From the
envelope theorem, the marginal effect of B on
x ˜  max
x x , x 
x
is just equal to the direct effect
E 

B	x x
2  B  x
x
2  B  x
,
which is unambiguously positive. The marginal effect of h is E 
(B/h) which is therefore also positive. Therefore, more neck-
and-neck industries (those with larger h) have a higher peak in
the inverted U. Moreover, the peak occurs at the value of  such
that x  n0  B/3, or equivalently,
(24) 0  
h
2  21  h  h
2  21/3.
The peak lies farther to the right on the  line in more neck-and-
neck industries if d/dh  0, where  is implicitly deﬁned by
(24). Applying the implicit functions theorem to (24), we get
d
dh  h
2  21
1
 F,
where
F  

h
h
2  21
 1 
h/3
h
2  21/3
 0,
since
h  h
2  21.
Therefore, d/dh  0. This establishes Proposition 5.
APPENDIX 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Table IV presents the descriptive statistics on our unbal-
anced panel spanning 17 two-digit industries from 1973 to 1994.
726 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSThis is taken from an underlying ﬁrm level panel of 311 ﬁrms
which remain after matching the accounting and innovation data
and cleaning the data (removing ﬁrms with missing observations,
ﬁrms involved in major mergers, or ﬁrms with less than three
years of consecutive data, see Bloom and Van Reenen [2002] for
full details). The Lerner and technology gap measures are gener-
ated from the entire population of U. K. ﬁrms. From the data we
can see even the industry level patenting count is highly skewed,
with most industries taking out no patents in any given year.
Patenting levels also vary strongly across industries, in part, due
to different patenting intensities although in estimation the in-
dustry dummies will control for this. The Lerner averages 4
percent and ranges from 13 percent in Ofﬁce and Computing
Machinery in 1973 to less than 1 percent in Motor Vehicles in
1982.
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